A couple of updates on Satoshi

In the previous post I said it seemed "really odd" that Wright hadn't publicly demonstrated he had Satoshi's private keys by signing a message¹.  Wright has since said that he lacks the "courage" to do this, and at least one of the Bitcoin experts who had previously said that Wright was certainly Satoshi has since walked that back.

The simplest explanation here is that Wright doesn't have the key.



Re-reading that post, I see I commented to the effect that, while Bitcoin is often described as a means of anonymously transferring money, that wasn't necessarily so.  I said I'd get back to that, but didn't really, so here's a bit more:

Bitcoin's blockchain very publicly ties a given transaction to a timestamp and the keys of the sender and recipient (and probably other stuff I'm leaving out).  That's quite a bit of information to mine, even though the keys don't have real-world identities attached to them.  For example:

• If you see a series of transactions with the same sender and recipient over time, you can assume they're doing business.
• If you know that someone ordered a doomsday device online for one million dollars, and you see exactly one Bitcoin transaction for $1,000,000 in a reasonable time period around the purchase, that's a pretty good clue that that wallet is associated with the sale of a doomsday device.

The doomsday device is a contrived example, of course.  A real evil genius wouldn't be so obvious (though a henchman might ...)  The buyer and seller could, say, break the transaction down into unremarkably-sized pieces and use separate wallets for each part.  Nonetheless, the cardinal rule of anonymity on the web is that you've probably given away more than you think you have, if your adversary is really looking.  There are protocols built on top of Bitcoin to mitigate this, but Bitcoin itself makes no guarantee.

Another weak point is that at some point you need to get reserve currency in and out of a the system, unless you really, really believe in Bitcoin as a currency in its own right.  The easiest way to do this is via an exchange, which ties your transactions to a particular bank account.  It would not be wise to assume that these accounts can be kept perfectly anonymous.   Also, if there are relatively few people converting Bitcoin to and from reserve currency, the fact that everyone else has to go through them will leave its mark on the transactions in the blockchain one way or another.  Again, I'm sure there are ways to mitigate this, but they're not built into Bitcoin.

But then if you're buying and selling doomsday devices online, you really don't need my advice.




¹In Bitcoin circles the preferred method would be to transfer some small amount of Bitcoin from Satoshi's wallet.  This process includes producing a digital signature using Satoshi's key.

On the interwebs, no one knows you're Satoshi Nakamoto

Several major news outlets have recently announced that Australian Craig Wright has come forward as the person behind the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, inventor of the Bitcoin protocols.

I have no particular reason to doubt this, but more on that in a bit.  First, an update on Bitcoin.

In previous posts I've expressed skepticism that Bitcoin, considered as a currency, would come to supplant reserve currencies such as the Dollar, Pound or Yen.  I think that case is made by now.  The main points are

• The current Bitcoin money supply is a fraction of a percent of the dollar money supply
• The dollar value of Bitcoins actually spent in a day is an even smaller percentage of the number of dollars spent in a day
• While several major retailers have announced that you can "pay in Bitcoin", this generally means they're partnering with someone who converts Bitcoin to and from a reserve currency.
• The merchants themselves quote prices in a reserve currency and take payments in that currency.
• Bitcoin's exchange rate with reserve currencies is much, much more volatile than reserve currencies' exchange rates with each other
• As a result, there is little evidence that anyone holds on to Bitcoin except as a speculation
• All of this has been the case for years now

That doesn't mean that the whole exercise has been a waste of time or, for that matter, that a few people haven't made large piles of (reserve currency) money from it.  Bitcoin may not be a viable currency, but it's interesting considered as a payment method.  In particular, the "blockchain" used to provide a public hard-to-forge record of transactions, has seen interest from a number of players, including existing banks.

It's worth noting that the blockchain doesn't provide the anonymity that Bitcoin is rightly or wrongly known for.  After all, by design it's a public record.  But before we get to that, let's do a quick review of public key cryptography with the caveat that, although I've studied cryptography with some care, I'm far from a cryptography expert.

Public key cryptography uses a publicly known algorithm and two keys: a public key that everyone can see and a private key that only you should see.  In the usual version, RSA, the two keys are "inverses" of each other.  If you take a message and use one key to apply the algorithm, you get gibberish.  If you apply the other key to the result, you get the original message back.  This means you can use the system in two ways:

• Encryption:  If I run a message through the algorithm using your public key then (as far as we know), only you (or at least, only someone in possession of your private key) can turn the resulting gibberish back into the original message.
• Signing: If you run a message through the algorithm with your private key to get gibberish, then anyone with the public key can recover the original message but (as far as we know) only you (or at least, only someone in possession of your private key) could have produced the gibberish that you sent out.

Typically these are used together, along with a cryptographic hash function that can take any message and boil it down to a largish number -- a few hundred digits -- in such a way that (as far as we know), no one could have produced a fake message that boils down to that same number.  Putting it all together, if I want to send you a message securely, and assure you that I actually wrote that message:

• I use the hash function to boil my message down to a largish number, called the hash value, that (as far as we know) could only have been produced from my message.
• I use my private key to turn that number into a different largish number, that (as far as we know) only I (or ... you get the picture) could have produced and (as far as we know) could only have been produced from my message.  I add this "signature" to the bottom of my message.
• Finally, I use your public key to turn the whole thing¹ into gibberish that (as far as we know) only you can decrypt, using your private key.
• After you do this, you use my public key to turn the signature back into the original hash value, and you use the cryptographic hash function to verify that the message hashes to that same value.

What do I mean "as far as we know"?

All of these algorithms and protocols are widely published and widely studied by everyone from undergrads to renowned experts to the folks at No Such Agency and its counterparts.  This is a key tenet of modern cryptography.  Only private keys are private.  Everything else is public.  "Security through obscurity" is frowned upon.  While it is possible that someone has cracked one or more pieces of this system, it's unlikely for several reasons:

• The same entities that would be cracking the system are using it for highly sensitive information (they might also be using some secret system for really really sensitive information, but the information known to be secured using the widely-known systems is pretty sensitive -- military communications, money transfers ...).  If you know your system can be cracked you have to assume your enemy could figure that out as well.
• There are known ways to test whether your crypto has been hacked, mainly noting carefully who acts on what secret information (whether real information or carefully selected false information).  Military history has several famous cases of battles deliberately lost to avoid giving away that the enemy's code had been cracked.  Eventually, though, that information will be put to use.  Not long after that, the jig is up.
• No academic researcher has published a significant crack of the current "best practice".  By contrast, several no-longer-widely-used systems have been cracked in the literature (MD5, anyone?).  Cracking a widely-used system is a pretty good way to advance on the tenure track and/or line up a lucrative job and/or develop serious street cred.

If someone has cracked the current public-key encryption infrastructure, they're using that information very carefully.

OK, how about my other disclaimer, "or someone in possession of your private key".  Key management is where we separate the pros from the amateurs -- and even the pros get it wrong way more often than they'd like.

Even if you're using some sort of uncrackable-in-principle quantum cryptography, at some point you're going to want to actually read a message encrypted to you and put your signature on something you're sending to someone else, and to do that you need some sort of key.  With current technology, typically that key is a file that's been encrypted using a passphrase.  If I want to decrypt or sign something, I put in the passphrase and the crypto software decrypts my private key to use for the real task at hand.

There are several weak points here.  An attacker could steal my key file and guess my passphrase.  An attacker could install a hacked version of the crypto software that sends the decrypted private key to the attacker, or encrypts the message with the attacker's public key along with the real recipient's.  An attacker could install a hacked version of the crypto software that uses a not-so-random number generator in places where we expect an unguessable random number to be used (see the footnote below for more on how those last two would work).

This is just off the top of my head.  Real experts spend a lot of time coming up with more sophisticated attacks and ways to prevent them.  The point is that no matter how strong the actual encryption algorithm, there needs to be a key of some sort, and there are plenty of ways to steal or tamper with the keys.

So if someone comes forward claiming ownership of a private key that was created years ago and used in a very visible way and that could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, you may want to be a little careful before taking such a claim at face value.

Apparently, the only publicly available cryptographic evidence of the claim that Craig Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto is a digital signature that could have been copied from the publicly available blockchain.  This seems really odd.  You don't prove you have a private key by showing something already signed with that key.  You prove it by taking some new message of someone else's choosing, signing that and having the signature checked, ideally by yet a third person.  And anyone claiming to be Satoshi ought to know that.

On the other hand, reliable resources report that Wright has done essentially that using a different key that only Satoshi should have.  Additionally, Bitcoin experts who have met Wright claim he's the real deal -- he acts like Satoshi, he has the technical knowledge that Satoshi would have, he knows historical details that only Satoshi is likely to know, and so forth.

This is not to say that Craig Wright is lying or otherwise up to no good.  I have no reason at all to believe that or imply that.  My point is that that it would be a mistake to judge his or anyone's claim to be Satoshi Nakamoto based on cryptographic evidence alone.

So ... who knows?  At this point, we will probably never know for sure who Satoshi Nakamoto is or was, or even whether it was only one person.  Which seems somehow appropriate.

Postscript: The private key published by Craig Wright was used in an early block -- block 9 -- in the Bitcoin blockchain, in which a quantity of Bitcoin was transferred to the late Hal Finney.  As it happens, Hal Finney commented on a post on this blog.  The post was on anonymity, but his comment led me to his blog, where I saw a bunch of interesting stuff on digital rights management (DRM).   Naturally, I posted a reply to that, rather than his actual comment.  You can see the whole exchange here.

¹In practice, you don't use the public key system directly for large messages.  Rather, you use the public key system to encrypt a randomly generated key for a faster, non public-key system that is then used to encrypt the actual message.  Besides being faster, this also allows you to send a message to multiple recipients without having to generate a separate encrypted version of the whole message for each recipient key.  Instead, you encrypt the randomly generated key for each recipient.  I trust you can see why I left all this out of the main post.